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Abstract 
 
International cooperation to tackle complex common resource problems like climate 
change is extremely difficult. Although there is broad agreement on the nature of the 
problem and what is required to solve it, many nations continue to block any meaningful 
action for solution. This global cooperation crisis is baffling in the light of recent evidence 
about the surprisingly cooperative disposition of human beings. Research from social and 
natural sciences points to an unmistakable conclusion: people cooperate all the time, and 
they enjoy doing so. This picture of human behaviour is at odds with common assumptions 
about people being narrowly—and exclusively—self-interested, and prompts the question 
that we address in this paper: why, if we are so good cooperating at interpersonal levels, is 
international cooperation so hard? We address this question in three steps. First, we review 
the recent multidisciplinary evidence demonstrating that people cooperate much more 
than rational-theory models predict, and that this might stem from a natural, evolved, 
predisposition to cooperate. Second, we argue that there are seven basic mechanisms that 
determine whether or not cooperation is successful or sustainable: reciprocity, trust, 
communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement and we-identity. We group these 
mechanisms in a ‘cooperation hexagon’ that summarizes the current consensus about what 
makes cooperation work. Finally, we discuss what these findings mean for global 
cooperation. We argue that power games are not enough to explain off current 
international cooperation blockades. A new, comprehensive theory of international 
cooperation must be compatible with the recent insights about the fundamentally 
cooperative nature of human behaviour. We suggest that the search for this theory be 
made in three directions: a) establish how cooperation scales up from interpersonal to 
lager scales, and how the basic mechanisms of cooperation behave under conditions of 
unprecedented complexity and rapid change; b) investigate cooperation at the ‘meso-level’ 
of global governance—the relatively small group of people who represent nations in 
international discussions and institutions—a key interface between interpersonal and 
inter-institutional motivations for cooperation; and c) examine patterns of international 
cooperation in the light of the cooperation hexagon, to ascertain whether international 
cooperation blockades are the result of the underprovisioning of the basic mechanisms of 
cooperation, and how these mechanisms can be used as criteria for designing better 
institutions for global governance. 
Keywords: Global Cooperation, human behaviour, reciprocity, evolution, trust, 
international relations, climate change, commons, G-20 
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The Behavioural Dimensions of International 
Cooperation 
Dirk Messner, Alejandro Guarín, Daniel Haun 
 
1 How Can We Learn to Cooperate in a World of Nine Billion People? 
‘Great powers’ … ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant  
power over others, because having dominant power is the  
best means to ensure one’s own survival.’  
John J. Mearsheimer (2001: xi) 
‘I believe we are ready to break free of the selfishness  
myth and embrace human cooperation as the  
powerful and potentially positive force that it is.’  
Yochai Benkler (2011: 22) 
‘Humans putting their heads together in  
shared cooperative activities are thus  
the originators of human culture.’  
Michael Tomasello (2009: 99) 
 
Yochai Benkler poignantly summarized the challenges of cooperation at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century: ‘The world is changing at lightning speed. We 
are now in a period of our history when we need to learn how to rely on one 
another more than ever’ (Benkler 2011: 22). Avoiding catastrophic climate change 
that can threaten human civilization as we know it may be the ultimate cooperation 
challenge that our species has yet faced. Harnessing the power contained in fossil 
fuels has allowed more people to enjoy material well-being than ever before. 
Accumulated underground over the course of millions of years, these fuels have 
been a ‘cross-scale subsidy’ (Carpenter et al. 2001), a relatively cheap source of 
energy that enabled rapid industrialization during the last two centuries 
(Osterhammel 2009). Yet these triumphs have been overshadowed by the 
unintended consequences of burning fossil fuels. There is now broad scientific 
agreement that our carbon-intensive economy has changed global climate in 
noticeable ways and, perhaps more importantly, that if we continue along the same 
path it is very likely that further climate change will have catastrophic 
consequences (IPCC 2007). Such change will probably hit the poorest and most 
vulnerable people in the world the hardest (UNDP 2011; World Bank 2012) and 
might result in international security threats (WBGU 2007).  
There is broad agreement about what should be done. The solution, put simply, is 
to ‘leave as much fossil fuel in the ground as possible, for as long as possible’ (Sayre 
2010: 85). This deceivingly simple proposition involves a transformation of the 
global economy under severe time constraints (WBGU 2011). Such a transformation 
is only possible if nation states cooperate to develop joint rules that protect the 
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atmospheric commons and incentives that shift the economy towards a low-carbon 
path (Leggewie and Messner 2012; Messner et al. 2010). And yet, even though the 
science is clear and the options for collective action are fairly well understood 
(OECD 2011; WBGU 2011; World Bank 2012), getting countries to agree on action 
to prevent global climate change has proved very difficult. International climate 
negotiations failed to reach any substantive progress with regard to a climate 
change mitigation agreement. Similar difficulties arise when dealing with other 
global problems—such as global financial markets or cross-border migration—that 
can only be addressed through international cooperation. Embedded in the 
promise of an increasingly dense globalized network is a paradox: a spreading 
consensus on the importance and urgency of global problems, together with the 
rise of seemingly intractable cooperation blockades. Here we aim to address the 
simplest of all possible questions: Why? 
Why is global cooperation hard? The optimistic answer is that we have not figured 
out the right way to make it work. The current mechanisms and institutions that we 
have for international cooperation are simply inadequate: they reflect the bipolar 
world order which emerged after 1945, but are not appropriate to deal with the 
global interdependencies and commons of the twenty-first century. This is the view 
of Global Governance theories (Messner and Nuscheler 2006; Nye and Donahue 
2000; Rosenau 1992; Zürn 2005), which claim that fundamental reforms are needed 
to organize, coordinate and enforce rules of the game for the global community 
(Rittberger 1995). 
Recently however, Global Governance theories are on the defence. These ideas 
were formulated after the end of the Cold War, when some saw a window of 
opportunity for pushing forward the strengthening of multilateral institutions, 
international law, and new patterns global cooperation (Commission on Global 
Governance 1995; Cooper and Antkiewicz 2008; Kennedy, Messner, and Nuscheler 
2001; Ostrom et al. 1999). But what if the relative stability and the functioning of 
the post-World War II global order were forced by the East-West conflict and the 
shadow of a nuclear threat, and relied on a historically unique configuration that 
has disappeared since the 1990s? Maybe it is not just that the current mechanisms 
and institutions for international cooperation are inadequate; perhaps the 
struggles for power in a multipolar world—in which any shadow of a hegemon is 
shrinking—will trump any possibility for collective action beyond the lowest 
common denominator where interests between nations directly converge (Barrett 
2005; Bremmer 2012; Mearsheimer 2001). This is the view espoused by the realist 
school of international politics (Carr 1942; Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). This 
school of thought assumes that human behaviour is ultimately driven by self-
interest and the maximization of individual benefits (Buchanan and Tollison 1972; 
Olson 1965). In the realist theories of international relations, this basic assumption 
about human selfishness is scaled up to the level of nation states: thus national 
interests and the competition for dominance in an anarchic world become 
irrefutable propositions. From such a perspective, Thomas Schelling’s (2002) hope 
that humankind could learn to sustainably use the global commons in the basis of 
international cooperation is highly unrealistic. 
The picture of failed global cooperation is at odds with a view that has recently 
aired in the life sciences: people are not always selfish; in many instances, quite the 
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opposite appears to be true. A substantial body of evidence from multidisciplinary 
research from the last twenty years suggests that human beings are in fact 
astonishingly cooperative. Research in experimental and evolutionary psychology 
suggests that children, from an early age, are inclined to share, to help, and to work 
together to accomplish common goals. Importantly, such a cooperative bias 
appears to have been part of humans’ biological history for a long time, and many 
of the necessary abilities and motivations heritable (Tomasello 2009). In 
experiments and field observations, behavioural economists and other social 
scientists have found robust evidence that people share and cooperate much more 
than a model of human behaviour based on narrow self-interest would predict 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Kahneman 2011; Ostrom 1990). These findings appear to 
hold true across many diverse cultural backgrounds (Henrich et al. 2001); they too 
suggest the existence of a natural human cooperative bias. 
However, in theorizing international relations and global governance the insights 
gained by the behavioural sciences beyond rational choice have been so far largely 
ignored. This is the gap that, we argue, should be closed. Because, given the high 
level of cooperation between people, what should come as a surprise is that 
international cooperation fails. The aim of this paper is to address this apparent 
contradiction between the obvious underprovision of cooperation at the global 
scale and the cooperative bias of individual human beings. In what follows we 
explore this conundrum by addressing three central questions:  
First, are we good or bad at cooperating? We argue that, contrary to the 
assumptions of the prevailing model of human behaviour used in economics, 
political science and theories of international relations, there is rich evidence that 
cooperation is widespread and comes naturally to humans. We discuss a wealth of 
experimental and field research that demonstrates that people’s cooperative bias 
manifests itself even during the first few months of childhood, that this bias is 
shared with our common primate relatives and is thus deeply rooted in our 
evolutionary history, and that this preference for cooperation appears to emerge 
regardless of the culture we are born into. Our first goal is to call for a fundamental 
change in perspective in how we understand human relationships.  
Second, what are the essential mechanisms that enable or prevent cooperation? We 
draw from multidisciplinary research on the evolutionary and behavioural bases of 
human cooperation to show that there is remarkable convergence about the 
relatively small group of factors on which the success or failure of cooperation 
depends: reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement and 
we-identity. We propose a ‘cooperation hexagon’ to represent the emerging 
consensus about what makes cooperation work. Our second goal is, then, to take 
stock of what we know about basic mechanisms of cooperation.  
Third, what does this knowledge mean for understanding cooperation at an 
international level? We argue that taking the behavioural insights about 
cooperation seriously should prompt a search for a behaviourally-sound theory of 
international relations. We propose that this search be conducted in three 
directions: first, if humans have an innate cooperative bias and the basic 
mechanisms for cooperation apply across time and space, then we must establish 
whether these mechanisms are relevant for joint problem-solving at any scale, from 
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small groups to the global arena. Second, global cooperation is done by individual 
people who represent countries at international institutions or in international 
negotiation processes—and yet we know very little about cooperation in this meso-
dimension of global governance, a point of confluence of individual motivations, 
collective identities within the groups of international negotiators or within global 
policy networks, and larger societal interests. Third, seeing the current blockades in 
international cooperation through the light of the behavioural and evolutionary 
evidence could provide a much richer picture of international relations. From such a 
perspective, the global ‘cooperation crisis’ is not just about intractable power 
games, but also about the underprovisioning of the basic mechanisms of 
cooperation. As a consequence, a key role of global governance is to foster the 
development of these mechanisms.  
We structure this paper around these three fundamental questions. In Section 2 
we look at the evidence for the cooperative bias of human beings. In Section 3, we 
examine the key factors that shape cooperation at the interpersonal level, and then 
in Section 4 discuss the implications of such findings for international cooperation. 
We end the article by addressing some of the theoretical and practical 
consequences of using a behavioural approach to studying international 
cooperation.  
2 Are We Good or Bad at Cooperating? 
‘Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which  
individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a  
common good, you can expect little help from biological nature.  
Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are  
born selfish. Let us understand what our selfish genes  
are to us, because we may then at least have the  
chance to upset their designs, something which  
no other species has ever aspired to do.’  
Richard Dawkins (1976: 3) 
‘Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of evolution  
is its ability to generate cooperation in a  
competitive world. Thus, we might add  
“natural cooperation” as a third  
fundamental Principle of  
evolution beside mutation  
and natural selection.’ 
Martin Nowak (2006: 1563) 
2.1 The Conventional View: We are Bad at Cooperating 
The theories that dominate the fields of economics and political science assume 
that human beings always behave competitively and make rational choices with the 
only goal of furthering their narrow interests and maximizing their profits and 
utilities. They do so in isolation from other actors, based on ‘complete information 
about the structure of the situation they are in, including the preferences of other 
actors, the full range of possible actions, and the probability associated with each 
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outcome resulting from a combination of actions’ (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 
2010: 217). From the point of view of such theories the answer to the question 
posed in the heading of this section is obvious: we are bad at cooperating. We are 
not naturally prone to cooperate, and when we do so it is either a result of external 
coercion or a consequence of misjudging the real costs and benefits of a particular 
decision; cooperation is thus an ‘evolutionary mistake’ (Lohman 2013: 280). In any 
case, it is a type of cooperation based on the lowest common denominator, not one 
which can help to maintain a public resource (or commons) such as the global 
climate (Milinski et al. 2008).  
In what follows we seek to show that there is now overwhelming evidence to 
seriously discredit such a perspective. However, before we go any further, it is 
important to clarify what we mean by cooperation. Traditionally a distinction has 
been made between mutualism—situations in which two or more interested 
parties collaborate for mutual benefit—and altruism—selfless acts of generosity 
for which no reward is (apparently) sought or expected (Tomasello 2009). A 
definition of cooperation such as Melis and Semmann’s (2010: 2663)—‘behaviours 
which provide a benefit to another individual (recipient) or are beneficial to both 
the actor and the recipient’—is broad enough to capture these two dimensions and 
applies to many of the situations we describe in this paper. Sometimes, however, a 
narrower perspective is more appropriate. Coakley and Nowak’s (2013: 4) definition 
of cooperation as ‘a form of working together in which one individual pays a cost (in 
terms of fitness, whether genetic or cultural) and another gains a benefit as a 
result’ emphasizes the fact that, strictly speaking, cooperation is a costly 
endeavour. This clarification is particularly useful when dealing with the problem of 
public goods governance—such as dealing with climate change—in which free-
riding is tempting and cooperation is, by necessity, costly. We would add that, to 
truly constitute cooperation, these costly actions must show other-regarding 
preferences. For example, selfish individuals work together every day to coordinate 
(costly) market transactions, but they will stop at the point when doing so would 
make them worse-off—the so-called Pareto optimum. In a cooperative context or 
society, this zero-sum is not enough, and individuals engage in costly relations with 
the welfare of others in mind. Finally, these definitions focus on behaviour and 
leave aside the difficult question of motivation. Some forms of cooperation might 
appear fully unselfish (i.e. altruistic) but they may be motivated by fear of 
punishment, envy, or even habit. Here we will avoid using the term ‘altruism’ 
because of its implications of a particular type of motivation.  
Having made this clarification, we can now examine the assumptions of 
conventional theories more closely. The model of society underpinned by 
fundamentally uncooperative human behaviour is part of a long intellectual 
tradition. The point of departure of Hobbes’s 1651 Leviathan is that the natural (i.e. 
pre-societal) state of humans is war of all against all. According to Hobbes, social 
order can only be achieved when a strong authority is able to restrain and discipline 
the self-regarding behaviour of people. Adam Smith also had a vision of a society 
made up of self-interested individuals, but the aggregate effect of the individual 
pursuit of happiness would lead to self-organizing prosperity rather than violent 
anarchy. This tradition, in which the concept of utility-maximizing individual is 
linked to the idea of the minimal state has played an important role since the 
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1960s, both in theory (i.e. the ‘Chicago School’ of economics) and in practice (e.g. in 
the form of the ‘Washington Consensus’). 
The concepts (and language) of evolutionary theory such as ‘fitness’ and 
‘selection’ have been influential in social sciences, and particularly in economics. 
The rational choice model is founded on the idea that people are egoistical by 
nature, because otherwise our species would have become extinct. As a result pro-
social cooperation runs against people’s instinct to cheat and free-ride. Such social 
Darwinist views of the essential drivers of human behaviour misinterpret the 
original findings of Darwin’s theory of evolution. The social philosopher Herbert 
Spencer ‘invented’ the oft-quoted concept of the ‘survival of the fittest’ in 1864 
after reading Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859). Darwin himself borrowed 
this terminology from Spencer in the fifth edition of his great work (1869) defining 
survival of the fittest as a synonym for natural selection. Later ‘survival of the 
fittest’ was taken by the social sciences to mean ‘strength’, ‘self-assertion’ and the 
‘displacement of others’ (with or without force), but Darwin always understood it 
to be the ability and extent to which a species can adapt to its surroundings (e.g. 
despite adverse environmental conditions).  
This model of human behaviour that dominates economics and political theory is 
also the basis for understanding international relations. The realist school, a widely 
used approach to explaining international relations, assumes that nations engage 
in a power game to pursue their own interests (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). 
The absence of a global enforcer of laws creates an essentially anarchic system in 
which the strongest nations are able to pursue their interests at the expense of 
others. The anarchy of the international system translates into a competitive and 
conflictive nature of international relations, and structurally limits cooperation and 
the ability of states to identify common interests. As a result, states can only 
engage in ‘adversarial competition’ to defend their sovereignty and their interests 
(Reinicke 1998: 61). In the context of such theories the idea of global governance is 
naïve at best (Brzezinski 1997). The only thing stopping one nation from acting 
solely in its self-interest is the force (or the threat of force) of another nation. 
Global cooperation is thus an impossible proposition.  
In what follows we want to show that cooperation and pro-sociality are part of 
the basic repertoire of human behaviour. The Homo economicus is also a Homo 
socialis. While this insight is probably shared by many, it has been all but ignored by 
influential social and economic theories, and it is largely absent from theories of 
the international system. The realization that people are amazingly cooperative in 
addition to stubborn and self-interested creates a more complex but always truer 
picture of reality than the family of rational choice theories. It also questions the 
idea that people’s behaviour is reducible to utility-maximization that responds to 
appropriate punishments and incentives and is therefore easily predictable. 
Rational choice has enormous strength as a scientific theory: it is based on simple 
assumptions and identifies precise causal mechanisms. But if this theory accounts 
only for one part of human behaviour while hiding another that is at least as 
important, then the strength of the simplicity and clarity of the theory is not 
compensated by its shortcomings. As Albert Einstein was heard saying, ‘everything 
should be made as simple as possible, but not a bit simpler’ (quoted in Benkler 
2011: 18). 
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Our perspective on cooperation is not naïve. We do not deny the existence of 
self-interest, greed, selfishness, and national interests—but we do question the 
assumption that human behaviour is reducible to these features. Neither is the 
outcome of cooperation positive per se. Without cooperation, gangsters, mafias 
and terrorism organizations cannot succeed; goals and normative targets matter. 
And yet, without cooperation we cannot solve complex social dilemmas or protect 
the global commons. If, as we show in Section 2, cooperation is one of the key 
drivers of human behaviour, then the room of possibility for cooperation is much 
larger than what conventional theories would predict. If we can successfully 
decipher the fundamental mechanisms that make cooperation more likely, better 
or stronger (Section 3), then we can also draw lessons for structuring international 
cooperation (Section 4).  
2.2 A Fundamental Change in Perspective: We are Good at Cooperating 
The validity of rational choice and other theories that assume a fully 
uncooperative, profit-maximizing individual has been seriously questioned in 
recent years. Rather than being universal, competitive behaviour may apply only in 
specific decision-making settings (Akerlof and Shiller 2009; Kahneman 2003; 
Messner 1997; Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010). The assumption of the self-
interested individual has long been claimed to be a consequence of the ‘natural’ 
forces of evolution, and the pursuit of a biological justification for this social 
phenomenon has a long history. Surprisingly, while the question of cooperation has 
typically been seen as belonging to the domain of normative disciplines such as 
moral philosophy, recently it has found an unlikely champion in evolutionary 
biology (Margulis and Sagan 2002; Nowak and Highfield 2011). Mathematical 
modelling has demonstrated that populations of cooperators—i.e. individuals who 
act pro-socially—are not doomed to become extinct. A population of cooperators is 
a possible, although not inevitable, outcome of natural selection (Nowak and 
Sigmund 2007). Furthermore, it may be that populations of cooperators on average 
fare better than populations of non-cooperators, giving cooperators an 
evolutionary advantage. Such group selection might have been crucial in selecting 
for cooperative behaviour in early human populations (see Bowles and Gintis 2011), 
and it may indeed be necessary for the emergence of complex forms of biological 
and social organization across species. Cooperation may be a third mechanism of 
evolution, on par with mutation and selection (Nowak and Highfield 2011). ‘A large 
component of our cooperativeness’, write Almenberg and Dreber (2013:145), ‘is 
likely to be biological’. 
This evolutionary perspective is consistent with the fundamentally different 
understanding of human behaviour prompted by recent empirical evidence 
emerging out of the natural and social sciences. Research from multiple disciplines 
over the last two decades suggests that cooperation is much more common than 
previously thought, and that this might stem from a natural human predisposition 
to cooperate. People routinely cooperate to manage public goods such as fisheries 
or communal forests. The ‘tragedy of the commons’—the overexploitation of a 
common resource when there is no authority to control its use—theorized by 
Hardin (1968), is neither typical nor inevitable. Years of field observations and in 
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situ experimental research in a wide range of common resources has shown that 
users can and do self-organize to manage common resources adequately (for a 
review see Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010). Users of resources such as 
fisheries, public grasslands or forests are obviously self-interested, but they are not 
blind to the consequences of overexploitation. Under many circumstances, they 
self-organize and find arrangements that allow them to profit from the common 
resource while maintaining its integrity in the long run (Acheson and Wilson 1996). 
Experimental research has further provided a wealth of evidence about human 
pro-sociality under controlled conditions (see Cárdenas 2009). Although 
experiments happen in highly structured and stylized situations which do not 
necessarily reflect the complexity of real life—and should be thus interpreted 
cautiously—the breadth and depth of experimental research over the last 20 years 
provides one powerful indication: people commonly cooperate (at a cost) even 
when objectively they could be better off without cooperating. For example, in the 
ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982), a frequently used 
decision-making experiment involving two people, one of the participants 
(proposer) is given an amount of money and is asked to offer any portion of it to 
the other participant (responder). If the responder accepts, the money is split as 
proposed; but if the offer is rejected both leave the game empty-handed. Two 
results show up consistently: first, contrary to the assumption of a purely selfish 
individual, proposers typically make a substantial offer (on average around 50 per 
cent of their endowment) to the responder. Second, perhaps more surprisingly, 
offers that are considered too low by the responder (such as, for example, less than 
20 per cent of the original sum) tend to be rejected (Camerer 2003; for a review see 
Bowles and Gintis 2011). In a related experiment, the trust game, the responder 
can reciprocate and return a portion of the money to the proposer. Here too the 
results show evidence for pro-social behaviour: responders routinely give back a 
substantial portion of the money back proposers, often in proportion to the 
amount of the original offer (Ostrom and Walker 2005). In prisoner’s dilemma 
games—those in which two people have to decide whether to cooperate or to 
defect, with the best outcome for an individual being to defect—participants 
routinely decide to cooperate. Such behaviour has been seen in experimental 
settings (e.g. Clark and Sefton 2001) and in other real-life situations (including a 
popular TV show; see Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel, and White 2010).  
Pro-social cooperation is also evident in experiments that investigate people’s 
behaviour in public goods problems. Most of these games are variations of the 
following basic situation: participants are given an initial endowment of money 
which they can either keep or contribute (all or part of it) to a common fund. 
Through several rounds of playing, the more participants contribute to the 
common fund, the better off the group will be as a whole; the catch, of course, is 
that this is riskier from an individual standpoint than simply keeping the money. 
Objectively, each participating individual should act self-interestedly (and assume 
that the other will do so too) and contribute nothing to the common pool: free-
riding would be the most rational strategy. And yet the results of such games are 
not consistent with an exclusively self-interested behavioural model. Participants 
typically contribute at least some part of their endowment to the communal fund—
although the amount varies greatly depending on the specific circumstances (Ahn, 
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Ostrom, and Walker 2003; Benkler 2011; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Ostrom 
and Walker 2005).  
Recent work on the behavioural and evolutionary foundations of cooperative 
behaviour suggests that the cooperative behaviours such as the ones described 
above stem from a natural predisposition to cooperate. For example, a recent study 
by Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) found that, in a range of experimental settings, 
individuals chose to be cooperative more often when they reached their decisions 
quickly than when they had more time to think about it; this suggests that their gut 
reaction was to cooperate. Three types of evidence suggest such a natural bias for 
cooperation.  
First, children often cooperate at a very young age, something that presumably 
emerges naturally without much adult intervention. Warneken and Tomasello 
(2006, 2009) have shown that, before a great deal of socialization and even before 
acquiring language, children are inclined to help others in need (Hepach, Vaish, and 
Tomasello 2013), to provide helpful information to others (Tomasello, Carpenter, 
and Liszkowski 2007). Crucially, this helpfulness does not depend on being 
rewarded; in fact, rewards undermine this type of helpful behaviour (Warneken and 
Tomasello 2008). During mutualistic interactions, children show a cooperative bias, 
preferring to cooperate rather than achieve the identical outcome by themselves 
(Rekers, Haun, and Tomasello 2011). Importantly, children appear to like to 
cooperate, i.e. they are interested in the social interaction for its own sake, beyond 
the specific goal at hand (Gräfenhain et al. 2009). 
In addition, from early on, children are able to work together to solve problems 
cooperatively and achieve mutual goals, by assessing other people’s intentions, 
from around their second year (Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Tomasello 2009). From 
about the same age, children begin to understand the notion of joint commitments, 
and within a year or so more they are able to recognize the way tasks are supposed 
to be performed, and what their own part involves (Gräfenhain et al. 2009). The 
scope of these findings does not imply that children only or always behave 
cooperatively. Children may be inclined to help when the cost is low, but when 
something they really want (such as a favourite toy) is at stake, they can be fiercely 
uncooperative (for review see Rochat 2011). As we grow older, this natural bias for 
helpfulness is shaped and modulated by socialization. Our interactions become 
more and more inscribed within the norms and rules of society, and we start to 
shift from a more selfless form of cooperation to one that is more careful, more 
influenced by an expectation of what we can receive in return (Tomasello 2009)—
what Elinor Ostrom (2005) calls ‘appropriate behavior’. Socialization, in sum, builds 
on a natural predisposition to cooperate—a point obviously at odds with Hobbes’s 
or Hayek’s views on human behaviour.  
Second, evidence for cooperative behaviour in many other species—and 
particularly in other primates—suggests that cooperation is well established in our 
evolutionary lineage. Notwithstanding remaining differences between human and 
non-human cooperation, recent studies have shown that other great apes possess 
many of the cognitive prerequisites necessary for human-like collaboration. Three 
of the four non-human great apes have been shown to cooperate successfully in 
controlled settings (Hare et al. 2007; Melis, Hare, and Tomasello 2006; Rekers, 
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Cronin, and Haun, submitted). In particular, chimpanzees have been shown to 
recognize when they need help in solving a problem and to actively recruit good 
over bad collaborators (Melis, Hare, and Tomasello 2006). 
Recent experiments that compare humans and some closely related species 
highlight the commonalities—but also some key differences. One such difference is 
humans’ interest in, and understanding of, common goals. Other primates can and 
do collaborate to achieve common goals, but humans appear to have evolved 
distinct cognitive abilities to work in groups (Moll and Tomasello 2007). The ability 
to form joint goals—i.e. perform activities that require partners to know that they 
are in it together—demands cognitive abilities that appear to be exclusively human 
(Warneken and Tomasello 2006). Humans are unique among primates for the 
capacity to form joint goals and cooperate via ‘shared intentionality’, a mode of 
action requiring that all parties have an overall comprehension of the whole task—
a birds-eye view—and are able to ‘see’ their own individual role in it (Moll and 
Tomasello 2007): ‘what is common to all of these (…) phenomena is a uniquely 
human sense of “we”’ (Tomasello 2009: 57).   
Third, the predisposition to cooperate seems to be independent of culture. Most of 
what we assume to be universal traits of human psychology and behaviour come 
from a biased sample. The bulk of experimental research is done by researchers in a 
small group of countries in Western Europe and North America, and the subjects 
tend to be university students from these countries. Thus, what we know about 
human psychology is overwhelmingly based on studies with what Henrich, Heine, 
and Norenzayan (2010) call WEIRD—Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and 
Democratic—people. Research on cooperation tends to reflect this bias, but more 
and more evidence from field experiments in non-Western countries points to 
some important convergences. For example, in a replication of a version of the 
ultimatum game carried out in 15 small-scale societies (including foragers, hunters 
and gatherers, and pastoralists), Henrich et al. (2001) found that people in all 
societies made non-zero offers. There were differences that could be accounted for 
by the different levels of market integration, but overall, within a very wide range 
of social and economic organizations, people behaved in a way that was opposed to 
the predictions of rational-choice theory and consistent with evidence from 
Western industrialized societies. Similar conclusions have been reached by many 
other researchers in many other societies, and there is very little indication that 
differences can be explained by culture alone (for a review see Oosterbeek, Sloof, 
and van de Kuilen 2004).  A similar cross-cultural convergence has been found using 
other types of experiments, including dictator and public goods games (see 
Cárdenas and Carpenter 2008; and Cárdenas 2009 for reviews).   
In summary, humans manage to coordinate and cooperate even at a very young 
age. As soon as they manage to do so, they actively seek out cooperative 
interactions, apparently, because they enjoy them. Despite some differences, other 
great apes also succeed in cooperative interactions, indicating a long evolutionary 
history of cooperative abilities in the human lineage. These abilities and even 
similar strategies can be found in a large variety of human cultures, providing 
evidence for human’s natural ability and inclination to cooperate. Furthermore, 
recent findings in evolutionary biology suggests that cooperation is a major driver 
of human behaviour and that groups and communities with many cooperators and 
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At the centre of the diagram is reciprocity, the fundamental prerequisite for 
cooperation to be sustained in time. Despite our fundamentally pro-social 
tendencies, we learn early in our cultural development that reciprocity—i.e. not 
being a sucker—is central to engaging in long-term cooperation. Although all the 
elements in the cooperation hexagon are important, we contend that four of them 
are necessary to create conditions conducive to reciprocity: trust, communication (a 
key mechanism to develop trust), the ability to determine people’s reputation as 
trustworthy partners, and the perception that the interaction is fair. In addition to 
these four mechanisms, we can use enforcement (via punishment or reward) as a 
means to rein in uncooperative partners. And finally, these mechanisms that enable 
reciprocation are much more likely to emerge within groups that are physically 
similar or that share a common narrative—in other words, with those with which we 
share a we-identity.  
Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is the main evolutionary mechanism underlying cooperation (Nowak 
and Highfield 2011; Nowak and Sigmund 2007), and one of the basic norms taught 
in all societies (Ostrom 2005). Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative, which is 
found simultaneously in virtually all non-Western philosophical traditions, reflects 
the basic principle of reciprocity. That we do something for others when they in 
turn do something for us (direct reciprocity) does not seem particularly striking. We 
help those who help us and not those who don't: the strategy of tit-for-tat (Axelrod 
1984). What is truly remarkable is how often we do something for others when no 
reward is apparent or expected. Biologists and evolutionary theorists have used 
mathematical tools to investigate how stable populations of altruists might have 
evolved. They have shown that cooperation among individuals is more likely to 
occur the more closely related genetically they are because it increases the 
likelihood of cooperative genes to be passed onto the next generation. This notion, 
referred to as kin selection, was first proposed by Hamilton (1964).  
Reciprocity between individuals who are not related genetically presents a more 
complicated problem. Trivers (1971) suggested that the probability that non-
related individuals will behave altruistically towards each other is positively related 
to the probability that the altruistic act will be reciprocated in another occasion 
(indirect reciprocity). Such probability is increased when individuals interact 
repeatedly, live long lives, coexist in small groups, and when the cost of 
cooperating is relatively small. Indirect reciprocity is one of the key building blocks 
of cooperation in human societies (Nowak and Highfield 2011). We live in large 
groups and cannot always rely on direct exchange to be cooperative or to expect 
help from others. Language, gossip, reputation and other mechanisms of control—
particularly the market—allow us to cooperate with others without expecting a 
direct retribution, knowing that someday the favour will be returned. It is a case of 
‘I scratch your back and someone else will scratch mine’ (Nowak and Highfield 
2011:53).  
Observations from real-life situations and experiments make it evident that 
reciprocity is a crucial ingredient of cooperation not only theoretically, but also in 
practice. Several observations of commons management have found that one of 
the variables that leads to successful outcomes is the security that contributions 
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will be returned (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010). Many of the economic 
experiments that we report here have been designed to investigate human 
behaviour under various contexts of reciprocity. One of the most important results 
from such experiments is that many people use reciprocity norms even within the 
short terms of experimental settings (Ostrom 2005: 47). For example, in the 
ultimatum game, participants routinely make generous offers with the expectation 
that they will be reciprocated. Importantly, when people make themselves 
vulnerable by making one-sided displays of cooperativeness, partners tend to 
reciprocate rather than exploit this behaviour (Bowles and Gintis 2011: 21). 
Obviously reciprocity is not only about positive interactions. In a context of 
mistrust and uncooperative behaviour, reciprocity can lead to a downward spiral of 
anti-cooperation in which even formerly cooperative people stop cooperating 
(Nowak 2006). 
Trust 
Multidisciplinary research suggests that establishing trust is a precondition to 
successful cooperation. Despite its importance, trust is a rather elusive concept 
(Fehr 2009). Psychologists often refer to trust as belief about the probability of 
reciprocation (Rousseau et al. 1998: 395). Economists use a narrower definition of 
trust that is based on people's behaviour in the absence of contractual agreements 
or external enforcement, such as in the trust game described above. Thus, for Ben-
Ner and Putterman (2009), ‘how much, if at all, A trusts B is indicated by the degree 
to which A displays a willingness to engage with B in an interaction that has the 
potential to benefit both A and B, but that would end up harming A were B to 
respond in a purely self-regarding fashion. A manifests trust by making himself 
vulnerable to B’s response in the hope or expectation that B will act at least in part 
with A’s interest in mind’.  
Trust is closely linked to reciprocity. Building trust is crucial for allowing 
reciprocity, and reputation is a way of gathering trust in larger groups where 
personal interaction (and hence direct reciprocity) is less likely. We know from field 
observations and experiments that the possibilities of cooperation are enhanced 
when individuals can develop trust and reciprocity, and that the gains from 
cooperative behaviour ‘depend on the willingness of individuals to take risks by 
placing their trust in others’ (Ostrom and Walker 2005: 7). 
But how do we know who to trust? In small groups of people with which we 
interact repeatedly, it is easy to keep track of others' actions and to know whether 
they are trustworthy or not. In a world full of strangers, we often rely on external 
clues, particularly on people's faces. Experiments have shown that we make very 
quick assessments about whether we want to cooperate with people simply by 
looking at their faces (van’t Wout and Sanfey 2008); we are also more prone to 
cooperating with those who look like us (Sigmund 2009). However, through 
repeated interaction we are able to gather more information about the behaviour 
of different individuals, and our preliminary judgment about their trustworthiness 
based simply on facial traits changes. For example, Chang et al. (2010) found that 
people make quick judgments about someone's trustworthiness based on how they 
look, and they use that first impression to decide how to play ultimatum games. 
After repeated rounds of play, as people gathered more information about others 
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based on their actual behaviour, they modified these implicit judgments and 
adjusted their behaviour accordingly.  
Communication 
Although cooperation can emerge even in the quick and anonymous interactions 
of daily life, it has been well established that communication greatly enhances the 
chances of more persistent cooperative outcomes. When we communicate we can 
talk about each other’s expectations, we can devise joint strategies and make 
pledges about our future behaviour. Face-to-face communication is known to be a 
key element in the collective management of natural resources in small 
communities throughout the world (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 2010). Field and 
laboratory experiments using public goods games in diverse settings have 
confirmed that, when participants are allowed to communicate, cooperation (i.e. 
contributions to the public good) is significantly enhanced (Ben-Ner and Putterman 
2009; Brosig, Weimann, and Yang 2004; Ostrom 2005). 
One of the remarkable findings of experimental research is that communication 
enhances cooperation even when the interaction is anonymous, for example 
through online chatting systems: there is something innately valuable about 
exchanging pledges that does not have to do with social shaming or the 
development of a reputation (Ben-Ner and Putterman 2009; Cárdenas and 
Jaramillo 2009). But isn't communication just ‘cheap talk’? The evidence suggests 
that the power of communication lies in the fact that we feel bound to stick to the 
pledges we make, and that this, in turn, creates a self-enforcing cycle of increasing 
trust between the cooperating partners. Such trust can even overcome initial 
reluctance to cooperate. In a public goods game, Milinski et al. (2008) found that 
when participants were given very different initial endowments, contributions to 
the public good were significantly higher when participants communicated 
(exchange of pledges) than when they did not.  
Why does communication improve the chances of cooperation? Communication is 
more than exchanging information about strategies or reputations. It is 
fundamentally about increasing trust (Ostrom 2005) and reducing the uncertainty 
of entering an agreement with someone else. If we believe that people feel bound 
to stick to their pledges, and others assume that we will do so to, then 
communication allows us to cooperate even though we both have our own 
interests at heart (Brosig, Weimann, and Yang 2004).  
Reputation 
Humans routinely use facial traits as clues to the trustworthiness of others. The 
use of such clues is useful in one-off interactions; but in smaller groups, when 
interactions are more frequent, people rely on history. We seek information about 
others' past performance to try to guess how they will behave in the future. In 
evolutionary biology, reputation-building is a key mechanism for indirect 
reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 2005). When cooperative interactions are not of 
the tit-for-tat kind (that is, direct reciprocity), it is very important that an individual 
can know in advance if others are trustworthy cooperators or not. A review of 
dilemma experiments indicates that cooperation levels decrease when the actors 
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do not know each other, or they cannot exchange information with each other, so 
there is no chance to build reputation (Ebenhöh and Pahl-Wostl 2008).  
Reputation is thus a matter is information flow. Experiments have consistently 
found that when information sharing is not allowed, cooperation decreases 
because reputations cannot be built.  
Reputation is subjective in the sense that we all perceive others' reputations in 
our own personal way, which is not available to others. Gossip and other forms of 
communication serve to synchronize reputations across populations (Nowak and 
Sigmund 2005) so that everybody knows who is a trustworthy partner. However, 
reputations are not static: they can be improved or damaged through our 
behaviour, and we routinely repair bad reputations through forgiveness. 
A recent study demonstrated the effect of honour and shame on cooperation. 
Both, publically honouring players who had contributed large sums to a public good 
as well as publically shaming players that had contributed very small sums to a 
public good, increased donations (Jacquet et al. 2011). 
Fairness 
For cooperation to succeed, it is often not enough that acts are reciprocated; 
reciprocation should also be perceived as fair. The evidence from the field and from 
laboratory experiments suggests that fairness is a critical component of 
cooperation. In a seminal paper, Fehr and Schmidt (1999: 819) provide a simple 
definition of fairness as ‘self-centered inequity aversion’. This definition is useful 
because it shows that no altruistic motivation is needed for some cooperative 
outcomes to take place. Using an economic model, Fehr and Schmidt demonstrated 
that, simply assuming that even a small number of people are averse to inequity is 
enough to explain a wide range of cooperative (and uncooperative) behaviours in 
experimental settings. The fraction of ‘fair-minded’ people is able to sway a group 
of selfish individuals into cooperation by, for example, resorting to punishment of 
uncooperative behaviour (Nash at al. 2012).  
What is unequal or unfair is subjective. Each individual perceives inequality 
relative to some group or outcome of reference. Such subjectivity has meant that 
fairness has been pushed to the margins of economics, as something that does not 
belong to its domain (Akerlof and Shiller 2009). And yet people in a variety of 
economic experimental games modulate their behaviour or judge the behaviour of 
others with regard to fairness concerns: people want to be fair, they want to be 
perceived as fair, and they expect others to be fair as well (Akerlof and Kranton 
2000).  
Inequality aversion has been consistently shown to be an important factor in 
shaping cooperation, not just in humans from an early age (Castelli et al. 2010) but 
in other social primates (Cronin and Sánchez 2012). For example, in a public goods 
game, too much inequality of endowments among the players diminished 
contributions to the public good, and this was attributed to players’ perception of 
fairness (Tavoni et al. 2011). In ultimatum games, offers that are perceived to be 
too low are frequently rejected because they are perceived as unfair, despite the 
fact that doing so is costly for the responder (Almenberg and Dreber 2013). Other 
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experimental and field results suggest that agreement to cooperate may be 
hampered when the cost and benefits are not fairly distributed (Poteete, Janssen, 
and Ostrom 2010). For example, in field experiments with fisher communities in 
Colombia, Cárdenas and Carpenter (2008) found that ‘social distance’ (i.e. 
hierarchical relations) and wealth inequalities among the members of the group 
constrained communication and thus the effectiveness of cooperation.  
Enforcement 
When trust and reputation are not enough to trigger cooperative behaviour some 
means of enforcement, such a punishment or reward, is needed. Punishment 
enhances cooperation in situations where reputation-building is not possible, or 
when people cannot improve their reputation through cooperating with others, 
such as in one-off interactions (Fehr and Gächter 2002). People do not just wait 
patiently (or passively) for a fair cooperating arrangement to take place: they 
actively punish cheaters who do not play by the rules and therefore harm the 
principle of reciprocity. What is more, the threat of punishment may be enough to 
deter free-riders and to create an environment that is conducive to cooperation.  
Many experiments in the laboratory and in the field have shown that the 
possibility to punish cheaters greatly increases the cooperative outcome (for 
reviews see Bowles and Gintis 2011; and Ostrom and Walker 2005). There is 
considerable evidence from public goods games that cooperation can be sustained 
if active punishment is allowed (Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002). This punishment is 
costly to the participants, but it shows that ‘punishing free-riders is itself a public 
good, and is no different from contributing to the public good itself’ (Bowles and 
Gintis 2011: 25). How, then, to ensure that people do not free-ride on the costs of 
punishment? A possible explanation is the idea of ‘pool punishment’: while most 
experiments have investigated direct punishment from cooperators to cheaters 
after the public goods game is played, it is also possible that they contribute to a 
punishing fund before they play the game (Sigmund et al. 2010). A police force—
something we all contribute to instead of taking punishment into our own hands—
is an example of the type of pool punishment institution that emerges both in the 
real world and in experimental settings. 
An important insight from experimental results is that punishment emerges from 
an intrinsic aversion to cheating rather than an instrumental desire to enhance our 
own profits. Fehr and Gächter (2002) suggest that punishment is triggered by 
negative emotions. In a post-experiment survey they found that people who 
cooperated the most were also those who punished the most, and that they felt 
angered towards those who cheated. Moreover, people who did not cooperate 
acknowledged that these negative emotions were to be expected. Such drive to 
comply with norms and to see to it that others comply appears very early in human 
development. Research with children as young as 18 month old suggests that we 
are (1) remarkably quick at learning ‘the way things are done’ (as, for example, the 
rules of a game or how a toy should be used) and (2) keen to enforce these set of 
rules on others (Tomasello 2009). Interestingly, in a series of public goods 
experiments that allowed for concealment of certain types of behaviour, many 
subjects chose to pay to hide when they punished others severely, suggesting that 
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harsh punishment—in addition to free-riding—may lead to a loss of reputation 
(Rockenbach and Milinski 2011).  
While it is true that people engage in costly punishment against cheaters, there is 
also growing evidence that positive rewards may be just as effective for promoting 
cooperation. In a series of public goods experiments, Rand et al. (2009) found that 
contributions to the public fund were equally high when people had the option to 
either punish uncooperative behaviour or to reward other cooperators. In these 
interactions—as in most other personal relations that we are involved in during our 
daily lives—people were not interacting anonymously or sporadically. Thus, 
‘without the cover of anonymity, it seems probable that people would be less 
inclined to punish and more likely to reward’ (Rand et al. 2009: 1272). 
We-identity 
When seeking partners for cooperation, it is very important that we guess 
correctly which individuals are more likely to reciprocate (Durrett and Levin 2005). 
How to do it? One of the fundamental ways we do this is by looking for those who 
are somehow similar to us; this is the idea of homophily (Haun and Over, in press). 
Experimental evidence suggests that we tend to be nice towards people who 
physically look like us (Sigmund 2009), and we also look for similarity in non-
physical traits such as how people act or how they speak (for review see Haun and 
Over, in press). In large and complex societies, the main source of similarity is 
cultural: we tend to cooperate better with those who believe in the same things we 
do, or who adhere to the same norms. Economic experiments have shown that 
people tend to cooperate more with those who look more like them (Krupp, 
Debruine, and Barclay 2008) or belong to their in-group, even if that group is 
defined arbitrarily (Burton-Chellew and West 2012).  
The evidence for the importance of similarity also comes from field observations 
of management of common property resources. The emergence of self-organizing 
management groups is difficult across ethnic or geographic groups when they are 
different, arguably because trust is harder to build (Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom 
2010: 44). Furthermore, results of experiments with public goods games suggest 
that if people who are predisposed to cooperate are allowed to associate with like-
minded people, cooperation can be more easily sustained (Page, Putterman, and 
Unel 2005). 
In addition to being a factor that we use to identify potential collaborators, 
similarity is something that we actively build. Language and communication are 
essential to this task. Through language we learn and build joint narratives that 
reinforce our sense of belonging. We actively use narratives—whether around 
religions, political parties, nation states or football teams—to expand our common 
ground and to actively be more like those in the group (Akerlof and Shiller 2009; 
Kennedy, Messner, and Nuscheler 2001; Scharpf 1999; Tomasello 2010). The 
communicative process is thus crucial for creating new arenas of commonality and 
to enhance belonging and acceptance in them.  
The existence of a we-identity allows us to perform acts of generosity and 
kindness with others within a group, but at the same time to inflict great damage 
on those who belong to other groups. Humans can cooperate very effectively, in 
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other words, with very evil objectives in mind, ‘but such deeds are not usually done 
to those inside “the group”’ (Tomasello 2009: 99). And yet, even within the in-
group, cooperation is not a static given. Within the group there is always defection 
and competition, so there is always a very dynamic process of cooperation, 
cheating, punishment and rewards (Nowak and Sigmund 2007).  
To summarize, whether cooperation works or not seems to depend on a handful 
of factors that appear again and again. Reciprocity is the most important of these 
mechanisms in the sense that it makes long-term cooperation possible. Next to 
reciprocity, communication, trust, reputation, and fairness seem to form the 
backbone of stable cooperative interactions: take one away and cooperation 
fizzles. Punishment (or its opposite, reward) can and often does nudge people to 
behave in a cooperative way, or at least to follow the rules of the game. Finally, all 
of these mechanisms emerge more easily, and are much more likely to persist, 
when the cooperators belong to a group and share common physical traits, 
languages, stories or ideas—a we-identity in short.  
 
4 What Does This Mean for International Cooperation? 
‘The cultures of human beings are based not only  
on exploitation, but on fundamentally cooperative  
processes as well. … indeed all of humans: most  
impressive cognitive achievements – from complex  
technologies and mathematical symbols to intricate  
social institutions – are not the product of individuals  
acting alone, but of individuals interacting …  
(based on) shared intentionalities.’   
Michael Tomasello (2009: xv-xvi)  
‘The scientific study of cooperation has a central  
role to play in achieving that cooperation.’ 
 Simon A. Levin (2009: 16)  
 
Until now we have talked about the capabilities of human beings to cooperate 
and about cooperation at the interpersonal level or between small groups of 
people. We have shown that there is consensus among different scientific 
disciplines that cooperation is widespread, and that a handful of recurrent basic 
mechanisms make cooperation possible. Our next step is to find out what is the 
significance of these insights for cooperation at very large scales. How, in other 
words, does our knowledge about human cooperation help us to understand the 
challenges of global governance and international cooperation? If people are 
fundamentally good at cooperating, this should prompt a new set of theories of 
international relations whose assumptions go well beyond the notions of power 
and self-interest. Such a change in perspective could reshape our understanding of 
historic patterns of social change, challenge received ideas about the nature of the 
current international ‘cooperation crisis’, and point in the direction of new lines of 
empirical research. Such a change could also help us identify the institutional, 
normative and cognitive innovations that are necessary to favour global 
cooperation in the twenty-first century. 
Messner, Guarín, Haun: The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 1  23 
Our review of the evidence about human cooperation should make apparent the 
limits of current theories which perceive the interplay between people, 
organizations and states to be exclusively the power games of what Amartya Sen 
called ‘rational fools’ (Sen 1977). As we have shown, humans do not only optimize 
their own self-interests, they are also able to cooperate and enjoy doing so: the 
scope for cooperation at all levels of human organization—including international 
relations—is therefore larger than it is assumed. For example, (neo-)realist John 
Mearsheimer (2001) contends that ‘a peaceful rise of China is impossible’ because 
power rivalries between old (Western) and new powers lead inevitably to conflicts. 
In light of the cooperation theories discussed here, this apparent certainty would 
seem to be more of a hasty conclusion. Power, dominance and self-interest are 
obviously significant, but evidently nations have cooperated successfully in many 
ways over the last two centuries, for example in the creation of international law, 
the establishment of international organizations (including the United Nations 
Charter) and in the development of institutions for sharing knowledge.  
We do not currently have this new behaviourally-sound theory of international 
cooperation. What we would like to do in what follows is to outline three of the 
directions that could lead to a more robust and more comprehensive theory of 
international relations that contemplates both people’s ability to compete and 
their desire and ability to cooperate. We elaborate on each within the subheadings 
of this section. 
First, we need to establish how cooperative behaviour ‘trickles up’ from simple 
interpersonal relations to larger and more complex forms. We suggest that 
cooperation can be seen as the mother of civilization, in the sense that our evolved 
cooperative abilities provide the building blocks that have allowed us to cooperate 
in ever larger and more complex ways. Our hypothesis is that these building 
blocks—the mechanisms of the cooperation hexagon—have scale-free properties 
that allow them to function in societies of increasing size. Cooperation, however, is 
not always an inevitable outcome; these mechanisms need to be re-established, 
reworked, or even reinvented when new contexts emerge. This change in 
perspective would allow us to see history in a new light, and, from historical 
evidence, to learn how people have built cooperation in times of upheaval and 
change.  
Second, we need to use the findings from the behavioural sciences to gain a 
better understanding of the meso-dimension of global cooperation. Large scale 
cooperation can be an emergent property of small-scale interactions, but in some 
cases—such as concrete negotiation processes and global policy networks—it has 
to be deliberate. The most common way of carrying out this type of high level 
decision-making is through relatively small groups of people that represent nations 
in international fora, processes, networks and regimes. We refer to this group, of 
which very little is known, as the meso-level of global governance. Our hypothesis is 
that the mechanisms of the cooperation hexagon should operate in these groups 
as well—but with the particularity that they represent a point of contact of 
interpersonal and inter-institutional dynamics. 
Third, we must shed new light on the current ‘cooperation crisis’, in a world of 
tectonic power shifts between Western countries and emerging powers (Gu, 
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Humphrey, and Messner 2008) through the lens of the cooperation hexagon. If 
people are fundamentally able to cooperate, why are there currently so many areas 
in which international cooperation seems impossible? Our hypothesis is that many 
of the current cooperation blockades in international cooperation can be explained 
not merely as power games, but as the underprovisioning of the basic mechanisms 
for cooperation. We suggest that such a view can help us draw useful lessons about 
successful cooperation strategies within the international system and help us to 
design better institutions for international cooperation. 
4.1 A Change in Perspective: is Cooperation the Mother of Human Civilization? 
Heraclitus is credited with saying that ‘war is the father of all things’. While war 
has undoubtedly played an important role in the constitution and stabilization of 
many forms of social organization (Waltz 2001), it is also possible to interpret 
human history as a long process of intense cooperation. From life in small bands of 
hunters and gatherers, the invention of agriculture and cities, the industrial 
revolution, and the development of the modern welfare state to the point of a 
global architecture of international organizations, the history of humankind has 
been characterized by ever increasing and accelerating complexity, which is based 
on cooperation between people (Fogel 1999; Osterhammel 2009). One of the most 
astonishing aspects of this increasing social size and complexity is that it happened 
relatively quickly: it has been only ten thousand years since the dawn of the 
Neolithic revolution—too little time for these changes to be accounted for by 
biological innovations in our species. Our cultural evolution, in other words, has 
rapidly outpaced our biological one. How can ever larger and more complex forms 
of social organization emerge from the same biological make up of our hunter 
gatherer ancestors?  
Our fundamental ability to cooperate might hold the key. One of the motors of 
human cultural evolution is cultural learning, i.e. the ratcheting-up of knowledge by 
building on what previous generations have learned (Tomasello 1999). Thus all 
relevant human inventions such as language, mathematics, science, cities, states 
and all other complex social structures are collective cultural products, which are in 
turn the result of cooperation (Nowak and Highfield 2011). From very early in our 
evolutionary history, humans relied on the fundamental ability and predisposition 
to cooperate in order to develop social norms, commonly shared rules of behaviour 
and solution strategies for interdependence problems, which cannot be solved 
individually. The cultural development of humankind may therefore be based on 
the cognitive abilities ‘that enable individuals of the species Homo sapiens to, in a 
sense, pool their cognitive resources, that is, to create and participate in collective 
cultural activities and products’ (Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003: 122). In this sense, 
cooperation can be said to be the mother of human civilization. 
It is important to know that human history has not been about a gradual or 
predictable progression towards greater complexity based on cooperative learning 
processes. Instead, history has been shaped by a series of radical transformations 
such as the invention of agriculture during the Neolithic revolution, the 
development of writing and the first nation states in Mesopotamia, and the 
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Industrial revolution of the early nineteenth century (Fogel 1999). What can we 
learn from this new reading of history through the lens of cooperation? Such a 
perspective could provide clues about the origin of these transformative moments 
in the level and complexity of cooperation. It could also serve as a guide to 
understanding whether people and organizations are able to overcome new 
cooperation challenges. Could it be that the new context of a dense and 
accelerated globalization which is approaching the limits of the earth system is 
overtaxing people’s ability to cooperate? Do our cognitive limits impose restrictions 
on our ability to cooperate in large groups (Dunbar 2009) or for goals that seem too 
distant (Kahneman 2011)? Is there a threshold of size or complexity after which the 
basic mechanisms of cooperation start to break down? These are empirical 
questions for which we have no good answers.  
The question also remains, exactly how and why the basic building blocks of 
interpersonal cooperation (i.e. those identified in the hexagon discussed above) 
come together to build larger and more complex cooperative institutions. It is 
possible that the basic mechanisms of cooperation (reciprocity, communication, 
trust, reputation, fairness, enforcement and we-identity) operate regardless of the 
size of the group that we live in. If these mechanisms were ‘scale-free’, then we 
could rely on them without having to invent new mechanisms in order to live in 
larger or more complex societies (Pagel 2012: 348). While the existence of scale-
free mechanisms alone cannot explain large societies, it can make them possible. 
Often large-scale complexity that appears to be ordered and purposeful (such as 
markets) is driven by simple local rules (Pagel 2012). For example, a simple social 
norm such as ‘do to others as they do to you’ (what is otherwise referred to as ‘tit-
for-tat’) is able to create apparent order out of random interaction. Extensive 
modeling has shown that cooperative populations can and do emerge out of 
interactions between individuals which are governed by minimal rules (Nowak and 
Sigmund 2007). These insights are very significant for the possibilities of 
international cooperation. While we cannot derive the ideal architecture of 
complex global governance systems from these simple elements, if the 
mechanisms of cooperation are the basic building blocks of more complex forms of 
cooperation, then they constitute essential design criteria for the development of 
international organizations and the structuring of international processes. Only 
institutional designs firmly anchored in the basic mechanisms of cooperation can 
create and expand cooperation spaces. 
However, as Nowak and other evolutionary biologists have noted, the simple 
rules of cooperation do not always lead to stable or persistent cooperative 
outcomes. As populations change (for example through migration or mutation) 
other configurations are possible. The development of cooperation is thus not a 
linear process, which leads to increasing cooperation or to evolutionarily stable 
situations. The empirical evidence, the reality of conflicts, cooperation blockades of 
cooperation or even war, show that while cooperation structures develop and 
expand, they can also successively erode and even collapse in cycles (Nowak and 
Highfield 2011: 35). While we have reasons to suggest that some properties of 
cooperation operate regardless of time or scale, it is also the case that context 
matters: some institutional and historical contexts promote cooperation while 
others inhibit it (Ostrom 2005). The mechanisms of the cooperation hexagon 
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emerge and stabilize themselves differently in small groups than in nation states, 
and differently in highly competitive environments than in charitable institutions. 
Thus they need to be re-established over and over in light of changing historical 
and/or institutional contexts. Where do we stand now in global governance arenas 
with regard to these cycles of cooperation? How can the current situation of the 
international system be described using the insights of the cooperation hexagon 
and what consequences could result for initiatives to favour cooperation? We 
address these questions below. 
4.2 The Meso-dimension of Global Cooperation from a Behavioural 
Perspective  
The wonderful, seemingly choreographed operation of large, complex systems 
such as markets can be misleading. As we noted above, intricate cooperative 
organization with the semblance of purposeful direction can emerge 
spontaneously from random interactions between individuals following simple 
rules. However, some of the particular challenges that we need to address in a 
global society of nine billion people do require a very sophisticated system of 
deliberate decision-making and coordination at local, national and international 
levels. The space for international cooperation is structured by the combination of 
widely different governance formations and polycentric networks.  
Global cooperation is therefore a pretty complex affair. But it is also, inevitably, 
something that is carried out by a relatively small group of individuals who speak 
on behalf of others. We refer to this level of interaction as the meso-dimension. We 
understand the meso-dimension to be international regimes, negotiating processes 
and policy networks in which public bodies and increasingly more private 
individuals work together. How is interaction between these individuals governed, 
and how is it different from that of other individuals making decisions at local or 
national levels? Our claim is that the behavioural perspectives discussed in this 
paper could offer crucial insights towards a better understanding of the meso-
dimension of international cooperation. International Regime theory (Rittberger 
1995; Zürn 2005) focuses on examining the relations between institutional designs 
and particular sets of problems. From a behavioural perspective, the question 
regarding the meso-dimension is how a concrete group of people—staff of 
multilateral organizations, foreign missions, civil society organizations and the 
like—work at a unique point of confluence of several scales. They cooperate at the 
interpersonal level, as members of a small group of experts, and as representatives 
of the interests of millions or even billions of people.  
To understand this particular dynamic from the perspective of our cooperation 
hexagon it is crucial to understand what Poteete, Jannsen, and Ostrom (2010: 228) 
call the ‘microsituational context’. First, the members of these groups interact as 
people. Do they know each other personally? Do they trust each other? Do they 
have similar information at their disposal? These are all relevant questions for 
dynamics at the meso-dimension of global governance. But, apart from their own 
personal interactions, these individuals also represent different interests which 
they bring to bear in their decisions. These are the (presumed or real) interests of 
the countries or civil societies to whom they are accountable, the interests, points 
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of view and feelings of obligation which arise within the groups of experts 
themselves, as well as their individual preferences and mental maps as experts.  
Within these internationalized spheres of activity, there are presumably many 
individuals who attempt to orientate themselves towards common global interests. 
However, the effects of this interest and motivation on the actions and decisions of 
the players are unknown. At the same time the decisions of the individuals (for 
example in trade or climate negotiations) are shaped by microsituational conditions 
with their specific procedures, rules and heuristics, and moreover embedded in a 
broader institutional and political context. The meso-level of international 
cooperation is thus the direct point of confluence of interpersonal and inter-
institutional dimensions. Hence, the problem of cooperation at the meso-scale is 
not about scale but about different drivers of cooperation. How does cooperation 
work at this point of intersection? This is a rarely examined area for which we have 
little direct evidence. Empirically understanding the meso-level will require the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, including participant 
observation, discourse analysis, game theory and experimental approaches. As we 
discuss below, the cooperation hexagon may provide a useful framework for 
further research.  
4.3 The Blocked Multipolarity from the Perspective of the Cooperation 
Hexagon 
Up to this point we have shown that there is a remarkable consensus about 
human predisposition to cooperate, and have suggested that there are plausible 
mechanisms by which this natural (individual) tendency might be important for 
understanding complex social organization and meso-level decision-making. If the 
hypothesis outlined here are right, then a behaviourally-sound theory of global 
governance would offer a radical alternative to the realist world-view. In this 
section, we suggest that, in addition to power, dominance and self-interest, the 
current obstacles for international cooperation are related to an underprovisioning 
of the basic elements of the cooperation hexagon. Here we suggest that some of 
the key difficulties of global governance stem from a period of transition in which 
reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, enforcement, we-identity and 
fairness need to be re-negotiated, re-established, or even reinvented.  
In the different theories of International Relations, current blockades in world 
politics are interpreted as power games resulting from the transition from a G 7/8 
to a G20 world (Bremmer 2012; Gu, Humphrey, and Messner 2008; Kennedy 1982; 
Mearsheimer 2001). Economic, political and military power resources are being 
redistributed among emerging powers and OECD countries—many of which find 
themselves in a state of relative decline. Western privileges in the international 
system are being questioned and the dominance of Western countries, which has 
lasted for over 200 years, is being eroded. The escalating power struggle between 
nation states is making international cooperation more difficult with the result that 
the G20 constellation is turning out to be a G0 world in which all countries involved 
are fighting to expand, stabilize or defend their own power resources (Bremmer 
2012), neglecting collective action activities to manage the global commons. From a 
classical (neo)realistic perspective, initiatives to improve the situation of ‘the West’ 
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are easily described: strengthen your own power, fence in emerging powers and 
defend dominance (Mearsheimer 2001).  
The existence of these power games cannot be denied, but viewed through the 
eyes of the cooperation hexagon the perspective of the various cooperation 
blockades and possible ways of overcoming them is altered. The basic mechanisms 
of cooperative relations between the Western countries have intensified 
successively since World War II. Investment in them has been massive. They have 
been routinized and stabilized in mutual regulations and institutions. After the 
disaster of World War II, the people of Western Europe, North America and Japan 
created a dense network of cooperation, including the establishment of 
institutions such as the EU and the OECD, despite many opposing interests and 
power asymmetries. The resultant cooperation culture helped to embed potential 
conflict potential and develop common interests. Viewed overall, these dense 
patterns of collaboration developed on the basis of the strong fundamental 
mechanisms of cooperation. Outside the North Atlantic, other institutions of 
international cooperation such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 
NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) or Mercosur (Southern 
Common Market) have different histories and configurations of actors. However, 
building them has also required time to build up trust, communication, and other 
basic elements of cooperation—especially when former enemies decide to 
cooperate for peace, as in the case of ASEAN (Acharya 2009).  
The cooperation blockades in the multipolar power constellation and within the 
G20—an important forum of the current world order in transition—are not only 
attributable to power struggles. Our contention is that these basic mechanisms of 
cooperation are rebuilt, re-developed and reinvented in this new constellation of 
players. Without these fundamentals of cooperation, the joint solving of problems 
can only succeed if interests happen to coincide—something impossible in the case 
of protecting global commons. Our answer to those who see only power conflicts 
and blockades is that these forces appear unrestrained in this phase of tectonic 
power shifts because they have not (yet) been embedded and defused by the 
structures of the cooperation hexagon, i.e. by functional cooperation spaces. Thus, 
the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ which threatens the standing of the 
(cooperative) West is replaced by a recognition that we might simply need time and 
effort to set up the mechanisms that enable cooperation to flourish.  
If this hypothesis is correct, then a perspective of the current global cooperation 
crisis from the point of view of the cooperation hexagon would yield important 
insights. A cursory examination, presented below, suggests that this is indeed the 
case.  
Reciprocity. The denser the interactions between humans and organizations, the 
more likely that people will show cooperative behaviour in advance without 
expecting something directly in return. Reciprocity therefore develops with time 
through repeated interaction. Reciprocity relations of this kind have grown 
between the OECD countries over almost seven decades since the end of World 
War II. It is likely that old and new powers in the G20 will have to first build up 
interactions to enable self-strengthening reciprocity to develop before they can 
engage in certain types of cooperation. 
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Trust. Trust facilitates cooperation and lowers the transaction costs of interaction 
between the players. Some of the obstacles for cooperation within the G20 could 
be attributable to persistent mistrust. Emerging countries assume that power-
retaining strategies lie behind the political initiatives of the G7/8 countries. The 
dichotomies between the G77 (an informal alliance of developing countries) and 
the G7/8 have by no means disappeared, and continue to dominate the build-up 
phase of the G20. Whereas the G7/8 understood itself to be a union based on 
democratic values, the G20 requires democratic, semi-authoritarian and 
authoritarian countries to work together. The trust potential within the old 
transatlantic community has also shrunk, as it has within the old G77. Trust is 
therefore likely to be a scarce commodity in the new power constellation. 
Communication. Without intense communication, misunderstandings, mistrust 
and stereotypes dominate. Relationships of mutual obligations, as well as an 
understanding of the interests and guiding principles of others, can hardly be built 
up. Intense communication relationships increase the chances of the emergence of 
cooperation relationships. Communication relationships in the G20 and also 
between G20 societies are still pretty thin compared to, for example, the 
communication relationships which have been expanding between EU societies 
over the last seven decades. 
Reputation. Trust and reciprocity are closely connected to the reputation of the 
players who have to : a reputation for cooperation. The lack of trust in the G20 
suggested above and the thin communication structures may result in chronic 
reputation problems within this new power constellation. All involved have to 
regain a reputation as trustworthy, cooperation-oriented players who not only have 
an eye towards their own interests but also towards finding solutions in the 
common interest or to preserve the global commons. 
Fairness. Fairness is of enormous importance in international cooperation. The 
grapple for a fair distribution of the burden stands at the centre of the climate 
negotiations. Developing countries complain about a structural fairness deficit in 
the international system established during the last 200 years, which has been 
dominated by Western societies. These issues of fairness play a major role 
regarding the distribution of seats in the control bodies of the IMF and World Bank, 
the setting of topics in the WTO processes, in the discussion about access to 
genetic resources, and the negotiations about ‘shared but differentiated 
responsibilities’ for climate change. Whether these are objective or perceived 
fairness gaps is of no consequence initially. Lasting cooperation relations and 
solutions to protect global commons can hardly be established without a common 
understanding of fairness. 
Enforcement. Cooperation can fall apart if those who refuse to cooperate are not 
punished or if those who do are not encouraged by special awards. There is little to 
suggest that international agreements on the protection of the climate, oceans, 
other ecosystems or even the stability of the global financial markets would 
function without sanction mechanisms which already exist in the international 
system. Although the WTO has an arbitration court mechanism and sanction option, 
the G20 has yet to reach a single agreement which is bound by sanctions. Both, 
emerging economies and the USA too, have refused up to now to give up part of 
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their sovereignty. No functional international regimes can be created without a 
global agreement on the significance of sanction mechanisms for the protection of 
global commons. 
We-identies and joint narratives. Cooperation in large, complex groups and 
communities is bound to fail if there is no common ground about the main 
challenges, their possible solutions, and the basic principles of collective work. The 
examples of successful international cooperation suggest a key role for a powerful 
narrative that creates a common identity: the European Union as a ‘peace project’, 
the great post-World War II transatlantic coalition to contain the ‘threat of 
communism’, or G77 as an alliance of underprivileged countries in a Western-driven 
global economy. Inventing a common, shared narrative for global cooperation in a 
G20 context is no triviality, because it involves nothing less than (a) finding 
solutions to global problems and the protection of global commons beyond the 
restrictions of nation states (political structuring in a global society); (b) the 
transition from a world order dominated by a Western power to one of multiple 
regional powers; and (c) the invention of a global growth and welfare concept for a 
population that will soon reach nine billion within the limits of the earth system.  
The G20 cannot therefore simply take over already established narratives from 
the old G8 world (as with the transition of the socialist states towards a market 
economy). It must develop a new, cognitively convincing and normatively 
sustainable narrative for the structuring of global processes which takes into 
account both power shifts and the functional limits of the earth system. The 
development of common notions of this kind needs time for nurturing (Weber and 
Johnson 2011). The changes that have to be processed in this narrative are 
enormous. They are only comparable with the radical changes from agrarian 
societies to complex industrialized societies which resulted in completely altered 
energy systems, economic structures, time regimes, human rights concepts and 
political systems. The international system with its almost 200 nation states and 
nearly nine billion inhabitants, all of whom have still to learn how to overcome 
global interdependence problems, protect and utilize global commons, accept 
responsibility for the further development of the earth system and create a post-
Western world order, find themselves in the midst of a ‘great transformation’ 
(WBGU 2011).   
From this point of view, therefore, institutional, normative and cognitive 
innovations have to be developed in order to improve the foundations for 
cooperation in a multipolar world order. Instead of more power and countervailing 
power, more should be invested in the basic mechanisms of the cooperation 
hexagon. A view of the current global cooperation blockades through the prism of 
the cooperation hexagon shows a complicated construction site on which the basic 
mechanisms of cooperation have to be built and developed successively. In view of 
the complexity of the task, the existence of cooperation blockades and weak 
cooperation dynamics are perhaps less surprising than the absence of large-scale 
conflicts (which the realist perspective would lead us to expect). The problems of 
the G20 are not cooperation defectors or those who fundamentally refuse to 
cooperate. There is a shortage of the essential basics of cooperation which have to 
be created on a completely new playing field by a radically changed constellation of 
players. 
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5 Conclusions 
We have argued that the evidence of a human cooperative bias should prompt us 
to profoundly rethink current theories of international cooperation. If we accept 
that the space for cooperation is larger than dominant theories allow, then we 
need to reconsider the assumption that national self-interests and competitive 
struggles will inevitably derail efforts for effective global cooperation. There is 
competition, and there is self-interest, no doubt. But cooperation is also happening 
around us all the time; any theory about human institutions that knowingly ignores 
this fact is simply inadequate.  
Our call for a behaviourally sound theory of international relations has been 
based on three key premises. First, we have argued that there is overwhelming 
evidence to show that cooperation plays a much more important role in human 
behaviour than is predicted by rational choice and related theories. New frontiers in 
theoretical biology make the case that cooperation, rather than an evolutionary 
anomaly, is instead a driver of complex forms of organismic and social organization. 
Cooperation has been part of the behavioural repertoire of primates long before 
our species evolved in Africa. Not only do some of our extant primate relatives 
exhibit certain obviously pro-social traits, but human children are keen to 
cooperate before they have learned the norms of culture. Moreover, this human 
cooperative bias appears to hold true across cultures.  
Second, cooperation appears to be governed by a relatively small set of basic 
mechanisms (what we call the cooperation hexagon). These have been shown 
repeatedly to affect the outcome of human interactions and to determine whether 
cooperation persists in time or not. First among these seven mechanisms is 
reciprocity—in other words the very strong aversion that we have to being cheated. 
Reciprocity is better established when there is trust, when we can communicate to 
share information, when we can use reputation to assess trustworthiness, and when 
we perceive the interaction as being fair. It is very difficult for cooperation to 
emerge or to persist if these five elements are not in place. Frequently the use (or 
threat of) punishment can be an effective mechanism to keep free-riders at bay and 
maintain cooperation in larger groups. Finally, cooperation is sustained through the 
glue of a we-identity. People who share common physical and intellectual 
characteristics, interests, ideas or narratives are brought together to cooperate 
with each other much more easily than those who do not.  
Third, acknowledging the pervasiveness of cooperative behaviour between 
people and the basic mechanisms that make it possible prompts us to call for a 
fundamental reformulation of current theories of international cooperation. 
Although we do not claim to have such a theory, we argue that the evidence for 
human cooperative bias opens up a number of research avenues. We propose to 
begin this exploration in three different areas: 
1. Cooperation is an important part of people’s behavioural repertoire and 
history shows that cooperation has been a key enabler of society’s 
increasing size and complexity. This suggests that the same basic 
mechanisms of cooperation operate at different scales and in different 
contexts, but that they have to be re-established and reworked. To 
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understand the relationship between interpersonal and global cooperation 
we need to establish the scaling properties of the cooperation hexagon, as 
well as how these mechanisms perform in times of crisis and 
transformation.  
2. Our society has devised a number of institutions and instances to deal with 
the day to day of international cooperation: this includes formal 
organizations such as the UN, and informal networks of knowledge 
exchange. Ultimately, then, global cooperation is performed by the 
relatively few people who interact in these fora—what we call the meso-
dimension of international cooperation. We hypothesize that the elements 
of the cooperation hexagon must operate among these groups, but with an 
important difference: these people are interacting not only as individuals, 
but also as representatives of other groups or even whole societies. It is 
crucial that we better understand how cooperation works at this interface 
between interpersonal and inter-institutional interests.  
3. Current blockades in international cooperation—most prominently, the 
failure to move forward to avoid further climate change—are attributed to 
power plays and the narrow pursuit of national interests in the 
international arena. Taking into account the behavioural dimension 
provides an alternative perspective: what is baffling is why, given our bias 
for cooperation, we have not succeeded at coping with these global 
challenges. We hypothesize, seen through the lens of the cooperative 
hexagon, the current crises in international cooperation can be plausibly 
attributed to an underprovisioning of the basic mechanisms of cooperation: 
a lack of reciprocity, trust, communication and reputation in international 
relations, as well as the perception that the burden sharing is not fair, the 
absence of credible effective punishing mechanisms, and the lack of a 
global we-identity.  
Taking the recent insights about human cooperation seriously should, at the very 
minimum, produce a shift in how we see international relations. The importance of 
a change of perspective should not be underestimated. How we frame situations 
can have real consequences for how we behave (Weber and Johnson 2011). The 
basic assumption of the impossibility of cooperation in a time of global power 
shifts can become a self-realizing prophecy if it is internalized as the guiding 
principle of the actions by certain players and institutions. In the same way, a 
perspective that looks at the challenges of international cooperation from the 
starting principle that people can and do cooperate could improve the chances of 
global cooperation. Moreover, scientific creativity and social fantasy are necessary 
to chart the spaces of future cooperation. This creativity cannot be expected of 
theorists who reduce human societies to utilities, payoffs, optimal strategies, self-
interest, national interests, rational economic people, and a priori efficient 
markets. ‘The limits of my language’, as Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote, ‘mean the 
limits of my world’ (1922: 74). 
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